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Abstract 
This article examines five common misunderstandings about case-study research: (1) Theoretical 
knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (2) One cannot generalize from a single case, 
therefore the single case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (3) The case study is most 
useful for generating hypotheses, while other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and 
theory building; (4) The case study contains a bias toward verification; and (5) It is often difficult to 
summarize specific case studies. The article explains and corrects these misunderstandings one by one 
and concludes with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a large number of 
thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a 
discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be strengthened by the 
execution of more good case studies. 
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Introduction 
When I first became interested in in-depth case-study research, I was trying to understand how power 
and rationality shape each other and form the urban environments in which we live (Flyvbjerg 1998a). 
It was clear to me that in order to understand a complex issue like this, in-depth case-study research 
was necessary. It was equally clear, however, that my teachers and colleagues kept dissuading me 
from employing this particular research methodology.  
 ‘You cannot generalize from a single case,’ some would say, ‘and social science is about 
generalizing.’ Others would argue that the case study may be well suited for pilot studies but not for 
full-fledged research schemes. Others again would comment that the case study is subjective, giving 
too much scope for the researcher’s own interpretations. Thus the validity of case studies would be 
wanting, they argued.  
 At first, I did not know how to respond to such claims, which clearly formed the conventional 
wisdom about case-study research. I decided therefore to find out where the claims come from and 
whether they are correct. This article contains what I discovered. 
 
 
The Conventional Wisdom About Case-study research 
Looking up ‘case study’ in the Dictionary of Sociology as a beginning, I found the following in full 
citation:  
 
Case Study. The detailed examination of a single example of a class of phenomena, a case study 
cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may be useful in the 
preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypotheses, which may be tested 
systematically with a larger number of cases (Abercrombie et al. 1984, 34).i 
 
This description is indicative of the conventional wisdom of case-study research, which, if not directly 
wrong, is so oversimplified as to be grossly misleading. It is correct that the case study is a ‘detailed 
examination of a single example,’ but as we will see below it is not true that a case study ‘cannot 
provide reliable information about the broader class.’ It is also correct that a case study can be used ‘in 
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the preliminary stages of an investigation’ to generate hypotheses, but it is misleading to see the case 
study as a pilot method to be used only in preparing the real study’s larger surveys, systematic 
hypotheses testing, and theory building.  
 According to the conventional view, a case and a case study cannot be of value in and of 
themselves; they need to be linked to hypotheses, following the well-known hypothetico-deductive 
model of explanation. Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy (1990, 121) put it like this: ‘one can 
validly explain a particular case only on the basis of general hypotheses. All the rest is uncontrollable, 
and so of no use’ (see also Diamond 1996, 6). Similarly, the early Donald Campbell did not mince 
words when he relegated single-case studies to the methodological trash heap: 
 
[S]uch studies have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value . . . Any 
appearance of absolute knowledge, or intrinsic knowledge about singular isolated objects, is 
found to be illusory upon analysis . . . It seems well-nigh unethical at the present time to allow, as 
theses or dissertations in education, case studies of this nature (i.e., involving a single group 
observed at one time only) (Campbell and Stanley 1966, 6-7). 
 
If you read such criticism of a certain methodology enough times, or if you hear your thesis advisers 
repeat it, you begin to believe it may be true. This is what happened to me, and it made me uncertain 
about case study methodology. As I continued my research, however, I found out that Campbell had 
later made a 180-degree turn in his views of the case study and had become one of the strongest 
proponents of this method. I eventually found, with the help of Campbell's later works and other 
works like them, that the problems with the conventional wisdom about case-study research can be 
summarized in five misunderstandings or oversimplifications about the nature of such research:  
 
 Misunderstanding no. 1. General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more 
valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge. 
 
 Misunderstanding no. 2. One cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, 
the case study cannot contribute to scientific development. 
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 Misunderstanding no. 3. The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in 
the first stage of a total research process, while other methods are more suitable for 
hypotheses testing and theory building.  
 
 Misunderstanding no. 4. The case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a 
tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions.  
 
 Misunderstanding no. 5. It is often difficult to summarize and develop general propositions 
and theories on the basis of specific case studies.  
 
These five misunderstandings indicate that it is theory, reliability, and validity which are at issue; in 
other words, the very status of the case study as a scientific method. In what follows, I will focus on 
these five misunderstandings and correct them one by one. First, however, I will outline the role of 
cases in human learning. 
 
 
The Role of Cases in Human Learning 
In order to understand why the conventional view of case-study research is problematic, we need to 
grasp the role of cases and theory in human learning. Here two points can be made. First, the case 
study produces the type of context-dependent knowledge which research on learning shows to be 
necessary to allow people to develop from rule-based beginners to virtuoso experts. Second, in the 
study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge, which thus presently 
rules out the possibility of epistemic theoretical construction. The full argument behind these two 
points can be found in Flyvbjerg (2001, chapters 2-4). For reasons of space, I can only give an outline 
of the argument here. At the outset, however, we can assert that if the two points are correct, it will 
have radical consequences for the conventional view of the case study in research and teaching. This 
view would then be problematic. 
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 Phenomenological studies of human learning indicate that for adults there exists a qualitative 
leap in their learning process from the rule-governed use of analytical rationality in beginners to the 
fluid performance of tacit skills in what Pierre Bourdieu (1977) calls virtuosos and Hubert and Stuart 
Dreyfus (1986) true human experts. Here we may note that most people are experts in a number of 
everyday social, technical, and intellectual skills like giving a gift, riding a bicycle, or interpreting 
images on a television screen, while only few reach the level of true expertise for more specialized 
skills like playing chess, composing a symphony, or flying a fighter jet.  
 Common to all experts, however, is that they operate on the basis of intimate knowledge of 
several thousand concrete cases in their areas of expertise. Context-dependent knowledge and 
experience are at the very heart of expert activity. Such knowledge and expertise also lie at the center 
of the case study as a research and teaching method; or to put it more generally, still: as a method of 
learning. Phenomenological studies of the learning process therefore emphasize the importance of this 
and similar methods: it is only because of experience with cases that one can at all move from being a 
beginner to being an expert. If people were exclusively trained in context-independent knowledge and 
rules, that is, the kind of knowledge which forms the basis of textbooks and computers they would 
remain at the beginner’s level in the learning process. This is the limitation of analytical rationality: it 
is inadequate for the best results in the exercise of a profession, as student, researcher, or practitioner. 
 In a teaching situation, well chosen case studies can help the student achieve competence, 
while context-independent facts and rules will bring the student just to the beginner’s level. Only few 
institutions of higher learning have taken the consequence of this. Harvard University is one of them. 
Here both teaching and research in the professional schools are modeled to a wide extent on the 
understanding that case knowledge is central to human learning (Christensen and Hansen eds. 1987; 
Cragg 1940).  
 At one stage in my research, I was invited to Harvard to learn about case methodology 'in 
action.' During my stay, it became clear to me that if I was going to aspire at becoming an expert in 
my field of expertise, and if I wanted to be an effective help to my students in their learning processes, 
I would need to master case methodology in research and teaching. My stay at Harvard also became a 
major step forward in shedding my uncertainties about the conventional wisdom about cases and case 
studies. At Harvard I found the literature and people who effectively argued, 'Forget the conventional 
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wisdom, go ahead and do a case study.'  I figured if it is good enough for Harvard, it is good enough 
for me, and I suggest others might reason like this, including whole institutions of learning. There is 
much to gain, for instance, by transforming the lecture format still dominant in most universities to 
one of case learning (Christensen and Hansen eds. 1987). 
 It is not that rule-based knowledge should be discounted: it is important in every area and 
especially to novices. But to make rule-based knowledge the highest goal of learning is regressive. 
There is a need for both approaches. The highest levels in the learning process, that is, virtuosity and 
true expertise, are reached only via a person’s own experiences as practitioner of the relevant skills. 
Therefore, beyond using the case method and other experiential methods for teaching, the best that 
teachers can do for students in professional programs is to help them achieve real practical experience; 
for example, via placement arrangements, internships, summer jobs, and the like. 
 For researchers, the closeness of the case study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth of 
details are important in two respects. First, it is important for the development of a nuanced view of 
reality, including the view that human behavior cannot be meaningfully understood as simply the rule-
governed acts found at the lowest levels of the learning process, and in much theory. Second, cases are 
important for researchers’ own learning processes in developing the skills needed to do good research. 
If researchers wish to develop their own skills to a high level, then concrete, context-dependent 
experience is just as central for them as to professionals learning any other specific skills. Concrete 
experiences can be achieved via continued proximity to the studied reality and via feedback from 
those under study. Great distance to the object of study and lack of feedback easily lead to a stultified 
learning process, which in research can lead to ritual academic blind alleys, where the effect and 
usefulness of research becomes unclear and untested. As a research method, the case study can be an 
effective remedy against this tendency.  
 The second main point in connection with the learning process is that there does not and 
probably cannot exist predictive theory in social science. Social science has not succeeded in 
producing general, context-independent theory and has thus in the final instance nothing else to offer 
than concrete, context-dependent knowledge. And the case study is especially well suited to produce 
this knowledge. In his later work, Donald Campbell (1975, 179) arrives at a similar conclusion, 
explaining how his work has undergone ‘an extreme oscillation away from my earlier dogmatic 
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disparagement of case studies,’ which was described above. In a logic that in many ways resembles 
that of the phenomenology of human learning, Campbell now explains: 
 
After all, man is, in his ordinary way, a very competent knower, and qualitative common-sense 
knowing is not replaced by quantitative knowing . . . This is not to say that such common sense 
naturalistic observation is objective, dependable, or unbiased. But it is all that we have. It is the 
only route to knowledge--noisy, fallible, and biased though it be (1975, 179, 191). 
 
Campbell is not the only example of a researcher who has altered his views about the value of the case 
study. Hans Eysenck (1976, 9), who originally did not regard the case study as anything other than a 
method of producing anecdotes, later realized that ‘sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open 
and look carefully at individual cases--not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of 
learning something!’ Proof is hard to come by in social science because of the absence of ‘hard’ 
theory, whereas learning is certainly possibly. More recently, similar views have been expressed by 
Charles Ragin, Howard Becker, and their colleagues in explorations of what the case study is and can 
be in social inquiry (Ragin and Becker 1992). 
 As for predictive theory, universals, and scientism, the study of human affairs is thus at an 
eternal beginning. In essence, we have only specific cases and context-dependent knowledge. The first 
of the five misunderstandings about the case study--that general theoretical (context-independent) 
knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge--can therefore be 
revised as follows: 
 
Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, 
context-dependent knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain search for predictive 
theories and universals. 
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Cases as ‘Black Swans’ 
The view that one cannot generalize on the basis of a single case is usually considered to be 
devastating to the case study as a scientific method. This second misunderstanding about the case 
study is typical among proponents of the natural science ideal within the social sciences. Yet even 
researchers who are not normally associated with this ideal may be found to have this viewpoint. 
According to Anthony Giddens, for example, 
 
Research which is geared primarily to hermeneutic problems may be of generalized importance in 
so far as it serves to elucidate the nature of agents’ knowledgeability, and thereby their reasons for 
action, across a wide range of action-contexts. Pieces of ethnographic research like . . . say, the 
traditional small-scale community research of fieldwork anthropology--are not in themselves 
generalizing studies. But they can easily become so if carried out in some numbers, so that 
judgements of their typicality can justifiably be made (1984, 328). 
 
It is correct that one can generalize in the ways Giddens describes, and that often this is both 
appropriate and valuable. But it would be incorrect to assert that this is the only way to work, just as it 
is incorrect to conclude that one cannot generalize from a single case. It depends upon the case one is 
speaking of, and how it is chosen. This applies to the natural sciences as well as to the study of human 
affairs (see also Platt 1992; Ragin and Becker 1992). 
 For example, Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s law of gravity was not based upon observations 
‘across a wide range,’ and the observations were not ‘carried out in some numbers.’ The rejection 
consisted primarily of a conceptual experiment and later on of a practical one. These experiments, 
with the benefit of hindsight, are self-evident. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s view of gravity dominated 
scientific inquiry for nearly two thousand years before it was falsified. In his experimental thinking, 
Galileo reasoned as follows: if two objects with the same weight are released from the same height at 
the same time, they will hit the ground simultaneously, having fallen at the same speed. If the two 
objects are then stuck together into one, this object will have double the weight and will according to 
the Aristotelian view therefore fall faster than the two individual objects. This conclusion operated in a 
counter-intuitive way for Galileo. The only way to avoid the contradiction was to eliminate weight as 
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a determinant factor for acceleration in free fall. And that was what Galileo did. Historians of science 
continue to discuss whether Galileo actually conducted the famous experiment from the leaning tower 
of Pisa, or whether it is simply a myth. In any event, Galileo’s experimentalism did not involve a large 
random sample of trials of objects falling from a wide range of randomly selected heights under 
varying wind conditions, and so on, as would be demanded by the thinking of the early Campbell and 
Giddens. Rather, it was a matter of a single experiment, that is, a case study, if any experiment was 
conducted at all. (On the relation between case studies, experiments, and generalization, see Lee 1989; 
Wilson 1987; Bailey 1992; Griffin et al. 1991). Galileo’s view continued to be subjected to doubt, 
however, and the Aristotelian view was not finally rejected until half a century later, with the 
invention of the air pump. The air pump made it possible to conduct the ultimate experiment, known 
by every pupil, whereby a coin or a piece of lead inside a vacuum tube falls with the same speed as a 
feather. After this experiment, Aristotle’s view could be maintained no longer. What is especially 
worth noting in our discussion, however, is that the matter was settled by an individual case due to the 
clever choice of the extremes of metal and feather. One might call it a critical case: for if Galileo’s 
thesis held for these materials, it could be expected to be valid for all or a large range of materials. 
Random and large samples were at no time part of the picture. Most creative scientists simply do not 
work this way with this type of problem.  
 Carefully chosen experiments, cases, and experience were also critical to the development of 
the physics of Newton, Einstein, and Bohr, just as the case study occupied a central place in the works 
of Darwin, Marx, and Freud. In social science, too, the strategic choice of case may greatly add to the 
generalizability of a case study. In their classical study of the ‘affluent worker,’ John Goldthorpe et al. 
(1968, 1969) deliberately looked for a case that was as favorable as possible to the thesis that the 
working class, having reached middle-class status, was dissolving into a society without class identity 
and related conflict (see also Wieviorka 1992). If the thesis could be proved false in the favorable 
case, then it would most likely be false for intermediate cases. Luton, a prosperous industrial center 
with companies known for high wages and social stability--fertile ground for middle-class identity--
was selected as a case, and through intensive fieldwork the researchers discovered that even here an 
autonomous working-class culture prevailed, lending general credence to the thesis of the persistence 
of class identity. Below we will discuss more systematically this type of strategic sampling. 
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 As regards the relationship between case studies, large samples, and discoveries, W. I. B. 
Beveridge (1951; here quoted from Kuper and Kuper eds. 1985, 95) observed immediately prior to the 
breakthrough of the quantitative revolution in the social sciences: ‘[M]ore discoveries have arisen 
from intense observation than from statistics applied to large groups.’ This does not mean that the case 
study is always appropriate or relevant as a research method, or that large random samples are without 
value (see also the Conclusions below). The choice of method should clearly depend on the problem 
under study and its circumstances. 
 Finally, it should be mentioned that formal generalization, be it on the basis of large samples 
or single cases, is considerably overrated as the main source of scientific progress. Economist Mark 
Blaug (1980)--a self-declared adherent to the hypothetico-deductive model of science--has 
demonstrated that while economists typically pay lip service to the hypothetico-deductive model and 
to generalization, they rarely practice what they preach in actual research. More generally, Thomas 
Kuhn has shown that the most important precondition for science is that researchers possess a wide 
range of practical skills for carrying out scientific work. Generalization is just one of these. In 
Germanic languages, the term ‘science’ (Wissenschaft) means literally ‘to gain knowledge.’ And 
formal generalization is only one of many ways by which people gain and accumulate knowledge. 
That knowledge cannot be formally generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective 
process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society. A purely descriptive, 
phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalize can certainly be of value in this 
process and has often helped cut a path toward scientific innovation. This is not to criticize attempts at 
formal generalization, for such attempts are essential and effective means of scientific development. It 
is only to emphasize the limitations, which follows when formal generalization becomes the only 
legitimate method of scientific inquiry.  
 The balanced view of the role of the case study in attempting to generalize by testing 
hypotheses has been formulated by Eckstein: 
 
[C]omparative and case studies are alternative means to the end of testing theories, choices 
between which must be largely governed by arbitrary or practical, rather than logical, 
considerations . . . [I]t is impossible to take seriously the position that case study is suspect 
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because problem-prone and comparative study deserving of benefit of doubt because problem-free 
(1975, 116, 131, emphasis in original; see also Barzelay 1993, 305 ff.). 
 
Eckstein here uses the term ‘theory’ in its ‘hard’ sense, that is, comprising explanation and prediction. 
This makes Eckstein’s dismissal of the view that case studies cannot be used for testing theories or for 
generalization stronger than my own view, which is here restricted to the testing of ‘theory’ in the 
‘soft’ sense, that is, testing propositions or hypotheses. Eckstein shows that if predictive theories 
would exist in social science, then the case study could be used to test these theories just as well as 
other methods.  
 More recently, John Walton (1992, 129) has similarly observed that ‘case studies are likely to 
produce the best theory.’ Eckstein observes, however, the striking lack of genuine theories within his 
own field, political science, but apparently fails to see why this is so: 
 
Aiming at the disciplined application of theories to cases forces one to state theories more 
rigorously than might otherwise be done--provided that the application is truly ‘disciplined,’ i.e., 
designed to show that valid theory compels a particular case interpretation and rules out others. 
As already stated, this, unfortunately, is rare (if it occurs at all) in political study. One reason is 
the lack of compelling theories (1975, 103-4). 
 
The case study is ideal for generalizing using the type of test that Karl Popper called ‘falsification,’ 
which in social science forms part of critical reflexivity. Falsification is one of the most rigorous tests 
to which a scientific proposition can be subjected: if just one observation does not fit with the 
proposition it is considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected. Popper 
himself used the now famous example of, ‘All swans are white,’ and proposed that just one 
observation of a single black swan would falsify this proposition and in this way have general 
significance and stimulate further investigations and theory-building. The case study is well suited for 
identifying ‘black swans’ because of its in-depth approach: what appears to be ‘white’ often turns out 
on closer examination to be ‘black.’ 
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 Finding black swans was an experience with which I became thoroughly familiar when I did 
my first in-depth case study, of urban politics and planning in the city of Aalborg, Denmark (Flyvbjerg 
1998a). For instance, in university I had been trained in the neoclassical model of 'economic man,' 
competition, and free markets. As I dug into what happened behind closed doors in Aalborg, I found 
that economic man does not live here. The local business community were power mongers who were 
busy negotiating illicit deals with politicians and administrators on how to block competition and the 
free market and create special privileges for themselves. The neoclassical model was effectively 
falsified by what I saw in Aalborg. Similarly, the model of representative democracy, which on the 
surface of things appears to apply, and by law is supposed to apply in Aalborg and Denmark, was 
strangely absent in the deep detail of the case. Here I found a highly undemocratic, semi-
institutionalized way of making decisions, where leaders of the business community and of the city 
government had formed a secret council, which effectively replaced the democratically elected city 
council as the place where important decisions on urban politics and planning were made. My 
colleagues in third-world nations, who appear to hold less illusions about markets and democracy than 
academics in the first world, get a good laugh when I tell my Aalborg stories. They see that, after all, 
we in the North are not so different; we are third-world, too. 
 We will return to falsification in discussing the fourth misunderstanding of the case study 
below. For the present, however, we can correct the second misunderstanding--that one cannot 
generalize on the basis of a single case and that the case study cannot contribute to scientific 
development--so that it now reads: 
 
One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to 
scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But 
formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas ‘the force of 
example’ is underestimated. 
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Strategies for Case Selection 
The third misunderstanding about the case study is that the case method is claimed to be most useful 
for generating hypotheses in the first steps of a total research process, while hypothesis-testing and 
theory-building is best carried out by other methods later in the process. This misunderstanding 
derives from the previous misunderstanding that one cannot generalize on the basis of individual 
cases. And since this misunderstanding has been revised as above, we can now correct the third 
misunderstanding as follows: 
  
The case study is useful for both generating and testing of hypotheses but is not limited to these 
research activities alone.  
 
Eckstein--contravening the conventional wisdom in this area--goes so far as to argue that case studies 
are better for testing hypotheses than for producing them. Case studies, Eckstein (1975, 80) asserts, 
‘are valuable at all stages of the theory-building process, but most valuable at that stage of theory-
building where least value is generally attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are 
tested.’ Testing of hypotheses relates directly to the question of 'generalizability', and this in turn 
relates to the question of case selection. 
 Here generalizability of case studies can be increased by the strategic selection of cases (on 
the selection of cases, further see Ragin 1992; Rosch 1978). When the objective is to achieve the 
greatest possible amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon, a representative case or a 
random sample may not be the most appropriate strategy. This is because the typical or average case is 
often not the richest in information. Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because 
they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied. In addition, from both 
an understanding-oriented and an action-oriented perspective, it is often more important to clarify the 
deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of the 
problem and how frequently they occur. Random samples emphasizing representativeness will seldom 
be able to produce this kind of insight; it is more appropriate to select some few cases chosen for their 
validity. 
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 Table A summarizes various forms of sampling. The extreme case can be well-suited for 
getting a point across in an especially dramatic way, which often occurs for well-known case studies 
such as Freud’s ‘Wolf-Man’ and Foucault’s ‘Panopticon.’ In contrast, a critical case can be defined as 
having strategic importance in relation to the general problem. For example, an occupational medicine 
clinic wanted to investigate whether people working with organic solvents suffered brain damage. 
Instead of choosing a representative sample among all those enterprises in the clinic’s area that used 
organic solvents, the clinic strategically located a single workplace where all safety regulations on 
cleanliness, air quality, and the like, had been fulfilled. This model enterprise became a critical case: if 
brain damage related to organic solvents could be found at this particular facility, then it was likely 
that the same problem would exist at other enterprises which were less careful with safety regulations 
for organic solvents. Via this type of strategic choice, one can save both time and money in 
researching a given problem. Another example of critical case selection is the above-mentioned 
strategic selection of lead and feather for the test of whether different objects fall with equal velocity. 
The selection of materials provided the possibility to formulate a generalization characteristic of 
critical cases, a generalization of the sort, ‘If it is valid for this case, it is valid for all (or many) cases.’ 
In its negative form, the generalization would be, ‘If it is not valid for this case, then it is not valid for 
any (or only few) cases.’ 
 How does one identify critical cases? This question is more difficult to answer than the 
question of what constitutes a critical case. Locating a critical case requires experience, and no 
universal methodological principles exist by which one can with certainty identify a critical case. The 
only general advice that can be given is that when looking for critical cases, it is a good idea to look 
for either ‘most likely’ or ‘least likely’ cases, that is, cases which are likely to either clearly confirm or 
irrefutably falsify propositions and hypotheses. This is what I thought I was doing when planning the 
Aalborg case study mentioned above (Flyvbjerg 1998a). I was mistaken, however, but to my chagrin I 
did not realize this until I was halfway through the research process. Initially, I conceived of Aalborg 
as a 'most likely' critical case in the following manner: if rationality and urban planning were weak in 
the face of power in Aalborg then, most likely, they would be weak anywhere, at least in Denmark, 
because in Aalborg the rational paradigm of planning stood stronger than anywhere else. Eventually, I 
realized that this logic was flawed, because my research of local relations of power showed that one of 
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the most influential 'faces of power' in Aalborg, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, was 
substantially stronger than their equivalents elsewhere. This had not been clear at the outset because 
much less research existed on local power relations than research on local planning. Therefore, instead 
of a critical case, unwittingly I ended up with an extreme case in the sense that both rationality and 
power were unusually strong in Aalborg, and my case study became a study of what happens when 
strong rationality meets strong power in the arena of urban politics and planning. But this selection of 
Aalborg as an extreme case happened to me, I did not deliberately choose it. It was a frustrating 
experience when it happened, especially during those several months from when I realized I did not 
have a critical case until it became clear that all was not lost because I had something else. As a case 
researcher charting new terrain one must be prepared for such incidents, I believe. 
 A model example of a ‘least likely’ case is Robert Michels’s (1962) classical study of 
oligarchy in organizations. By choosing a horizontally structured grassroots organization with strong 
democratic ideals--that is, a type of organization with an especially low probability of being 
oligarchical--Michels could test the universality of the oligarchy thesis; that is, ‘If this organization is 
oligarchic, so are most others.’ A corresponding model example of a ‘most likely’ case is W. F. 
Whyte’s (1943) study of a Boston slum neighborhood, which according to existing theory should have 
exhibited social disorganization, but in fact showed quite the opposite (see also the articles on Whyte’s 
study in Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, vol. 21, no. 1, 1992). 
 Cases of the ‘most likely’ type are especially well suited to falsification of propositions, while 
‘least likely’ cases are most appropriate to tests of verification. It should be remarked that a most 
likely case for one proposition is the least likely for its negation. For example, Whyte’s slum 
neighborhood could be seen as a least likely case for a hypothesis concerning the universality of social 
organization. Hence, the identification of a case as most or least likely is linked to the design of the 
study, as well as to the specific properties of the actual case. 
 A final strategy for the selection of cases is choice of the paradigmatic case. Thomas Kuhn 
has shown that the basic skills, or background practices, of natural scientists are organized in terms of 
‘exemplars’ the role of which can be studied by historians of science. Similarly, scholars like Clifford 
Geertz and Michel Foucault have often organized their research around specific cultural paradigms: a 
paradigm for Geertz lay for instance in the ‘deep play’ of the Balinese cockfight, while for Foucault, 
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European prisons and the ‘Panopticon’ are examples. Both instances are examples of paradigmatic 
cases, that is, cases that highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question. Kuhn has 
shown that scientific paradigms cannot be expressed as rules or theories. There exists no predictive 
theory for how predictive theory comes about. A scientific activity is acknowledged or rejected as 
good science by how close it is to one or more exemplars; that is, practical prototypes of good 
scientific work. A paradigmatic case of how scientists do science is precisely such a prototype. It 
operates as a reference point and may function as a focus for the founding of schools of thought.  
 As with the critical case, we may ask, ‘How does one identify a paradigmatic case?’ How does 
one determine whether a given case has metaphorical and prototypical value? These questions are 
even more difficult to answer than for the critical case, precisely because the paradigmatic case 
transcends any sort of rule-based criteria. No standard exists for the paradigmatic case because it sets 
the standard. Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus see paradigmatic cases and case studies as central to human 
learning. In an interview with Hubert Dreyfus (author’s files), I therefore asked what constitutes a 
paradigmatic case and how it can be identified. Dreyfus replied: 
 
Heidegger says, you recognize a paradigm case because it shines, but I’m afraid that is not much 
help. You just have to be intuitive. We all can tell what is a better or worse case--of a Cézanne 
painting, for instance. But I can’t think there could be any rules for deciding what makes 
Cézannne a paradigmatic modern painter . . . [I]t is a big problem in a democratic society where 
people are supposed to justify what their intuitions are. In fact, nobody really can justify what 
their intuition is. So you have to make up reasons, but it won’t be the real reasons. 
 
One may agree with Dreyfus that intuition is central to identifying paradigmatic cases, but one may 
disagree it is a problem to have to justify one's intuitions. Ethnometholodogical studies of scientific 
practice have demonstrated that all variety of such practice relies on taken-for-granted procedures that 
feel largely intuitive. However, those intuitive decisions are accountable, in the sense of being sensible 
to other practitioners or often explicable if not immediately sensible. That would frequently seem to be 
the case with the selection of paradigmatic cases. We may select such cases on the basis of taken-for-
granted, intuitive procedures but are often called upon to account for that selection. That account must 
Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings About Case-study research, 9.1 
 
17 
 
be sensible to other members of the scholarly communities of which we are part. This may even be 
argued to be a general characteristic of scholarship, scientific or otherwise, and not unique to the 
selection of paradigmatic social scientific case studies. For instance, it is usually insufficient to justify 
an application for research funds by stating that one’s intuition says that a particular research should 
be carried out. A research council ideally operates as society’s test of whether the researcher can 
account, in collectively acceptable ways, for his or her intuitive choice, even though intuition may be 
the real, or most important, reason why the researcher wants to execute the project. 
 It is not possible consistently, or even frequently, to determine in advance whether or not a 
given case--Geertz' cock fights in Bali, for instance--is paradigmatic. Besides the strategic choice of 
case, the execution of the case study will certainly play a role, as will the reactions to the study by the 
research community, the group studied, and, possibly, a broader public. The value of the case study 
will depend on the validity claims which researchers can place on their study, and the status these 
claims obtain in dialogue with other validity claims in the discourse to which the study is a 
contribution. Like other good craftsmen, all that researchers can do is use their experience and 
intuition to assess whether they believe a given case is interesting in a paradigmatic context, and 
whether they can provide collectively acceptable reasons for the choice of case.  
 Finally, concerning considerations of strategy in the choice of cases, it should be mentioned 
that the various strategies of selection are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, a case can 
be simultaneously extreme, critical, and paradigmatic. The interpretation of such a case can provide a 
unique wealth of information, because one obtains various perspectives and conclusions on the case 
according to whether it is viewed and interpreted as one or another type of case. 
 
 
Do Case Studies Contain a Subjective Bias? 
The fourth of the five misunderstandings about case-study research is that the method maintains a bias 
toward verification, understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions, so that 
the study therefore becomes of doubtful scientific value. Diamond (1996, 6), for example, holds this 
view. He observes that the case study suffers from what he calls a ‘crippling drawback,’ because it 
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does not apply ‘scientific methods,’ by which Diamond understands methods useful for ‘curbing one’s 
tendencies to stamp one’s pre-existing interpretations on data as they accumulate.’  
 Francis Bacon (1853, xlvi) saw this bias toward verification, not simply as a phenomenon 
related to the case study in particular, but as a fundamental human characteristic. Bacon expressed it 
like this: 
 
The human understanding from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and 
equality in things than it really finds. When any proposition has been laid down, the human 
understanding forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation. It is the peculiar and 
perpetual error of the human understanding to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than 
negatives. 
 
Bacon certainly touches upon a fundamental problem here, a problem, which all researchers must deal 
with in some way. Charles Darwin (1958, 123), in his autobiography, describes the method he 
developed in order to avoid the bias toward verification: 
 
I had . . . during many years followed a golden rule, namely, that whenever a published fact, a 
new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a 
memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and 
thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favorable ones. Owing to this habit, 
very few objections were raised against my views, which I had not at least noticed and attempted 
to answer. 
 
The bias toward verification is general, but the alleged deficiency of the case study and other 
qualitative methods is that they ostensibly allow more room for the researcher’s subjective and 
arbitrary judgment than other methods: they are often seen as less rigorous than are quantitative, 
hypothetico-deductive methods. Even if such criticism is useful, because it sensitizes us to an 
important issue, experienced case researchers cannot help but see the critique as demonstrating a lack 
of knowledge of what is involved in case-study research. Donald Campbell and others have shown that 
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the critique is fallacious, because the case study has its own rigor, different to be sure, but no less strict 
than the rigor of quantitative methods. The advantage of the case study is that it can ‘close in’ on real-
life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice.  
 According to Campbell, Ragin, Geertz, Wieviorka, Flyvbjerg, and others, researchers who 
have conducted intensive, in-depth case studies typically report that their preconceived views, 
assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses were wrong and that the case material has compelled them to 
revise their hypotheses on essential points. The case study forces upon the researcher the type of 
falsifications described above. Ragin (1992, 225) calls this a ‘special feature of small-N research,’ and 
goes on to explain that criticizing single-case studies for being inferior to multiple case studies is 
misguided, since even single-case studies ‘are multiple in most research efforts because ideas and 
evidence may be linked in many different ways.’  
 Geertz (1995, 119) says about the fieldwork involved in most in-depth case studies that ‘The 
Field’ itself is a ‘powerful disciplinary force: assertive, demanding, even coercive.’ Like any such 
force, it can be underestimated, but it cannot be evaded. ‘It is too insistent for that,’ says Geertz. That 
he is speaking of a general phenomenon can be seen by simply examining case studies, like Eckstein 
(1975), Campbell (1975), and Wieviorka (1992) have done. Campbell (1975, 181-2) discusses the 
causes of this phenomenon in the following passage: 
 
In a case study done by an alert social scientist who has thorough local acquaintance, the theory 
he uses to explain the focal difference also generates prediction or expectations on dozens of other 
aspects of the culture, and he does not retain the theory unless most of these are also confirmed . . 
. Experiences of social scientists confirm this. Even in a single qualitative case study, the 
conscientious social scientist often finds no explanation that seems satisfactory. Such an outcome 
would be impossible if the caricature of the single case study . . . were correct--there would 
instead be a surfeit of subjectively compelling explanations. 
 
According to the experiences cited above, it is falsification and not verification, which characterizes 
the case study. Moreover, the question of subjectivism and bias toward verification applies to all 
methods, not just to the case study and other qualitative methods. For example, the element of 
Flyvbjerg, Five Misunderstandings About Case-study research, 9.1 
 
20 
 
arbitrary subjectivism will be significant in the choice of categories and variables for a quantitative or 
structural investigation, such as a structured questionnaire to be used across a large sample of cases. 
And the probability is high that (1) this subjectivism survives without being thoroughly corrected 
during the study and (2) that it may affect the results, quite simply because the quantitative/structural 
researcher does not get as close to those under study as does the case-study researcher and therefore is 
less likely to be corrected by the study objects ‘talking back.’ According to Ragin:  
 
this feature explains why small-N qualitative research is most often at the forefront of theoretical 
development. When N’s are large, there are few opportunities for revising a casing [that is, the 
delimitation of a case]. At the start of the analysis, cases are decomposed into variables, and 
almost the entire dialogue of ideas and evidence occurs through variables. One implication of this 
discussion is that to the extent that large-N research can be sensitized to the diversity and potential 
heterogeneity of the cases included in an analysis, large-N research may play a more important 
part in the advancement of social science theory (1992, 225; see also Ragin 1987, 164-71). 
 
Here, too, this difference between large samples and single cases can be understood in terms of the 
phenomenology for human learning discussed above. If one thus assumes that the goal of the 
researcher’s work is to understand and learn about the phenomena being studied, then research is 
simply a form of learning. If one assumes that research, like other learning processes, can be described 
by the phenomenology for human learning, it then becomes clear that the most advanced form of 
understanding is achieved when researchers place themselves within the context being studied. Only in 
this way can researchers understand the viewpoints and the behavior, which characterizes social 
actors. Relevant to this point, Giddens states that valid descriptions of social activities presume that 
researchers possess those skills necessary to participate in the activities described:  
 
I have accepted that it is right to say that the condition of generating descriptions of social activity 
is being able in principle to participate in it. It involves ‘mutual knowledge,’ shared by observer 
and participants whose action constitutes and reconstitutes the social world (1982, 15). 
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From this point of view, the proximity to reality, which the case study entails, and the learning process 
which it generates for the researcher will often constitute a prerequisite for advanced understanding. In 
this context, one begins to understand Beveridge’s conclusion that there are more discoveries 
stemming from the type of intense observation made possible by the case study than from statistics 
applied to large groups. With the point of departure in the learning process, we understand why the 
researcher who conducts a case study often ends up by casting off preconceived notions and theories. 
Such activity is quite simply a central element in learning and in the achievement of new insight. More 
simple forms of understanding must yield to more complex ones as one moves from beginner to 
expert. 
 On this basis, the fourth misunderstanding--that the case study supposedly contains a bias 
toward verification, understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived ideas--is 
revised as follows:  
 
The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s preconceived 
notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experience indicates that the case study 
contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification. 
 
 
The Irreducible Quality of Good Case Narratives 
Case studies often contain a substantial element of narrative. Good narratives typically approach the 
complexities and contradictions of real life. Accordingly, such narratives may be difficult or 
impossible to summarize into neat scientific formulae, general propositions, and theories (Benhabib 
1990, Rouse 1990, Roth 1989, White 1990, Mitchell and Charmaz 1996). This tends to be seen by 
critics of the case study as a drawback. To the case-study researcher, however, a particularly ‘thick’ 
and hard-to-summarize narrative is not a problem. Rather, it is often a sign that the study has 
uncovered a particularly rich problematic. The question, therefore, is whether the summarizing and 
generalization, which the critics see as an ideal, is always desirable. Nietzsche (1974, 335 [§ 373]) is 
clear in his answer to this question. ‘Above all,’ he says about doing science, ‘one should not wish to 
divest existence of its rich ambiguity’ (emphasis in original). 
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 In doing the Aalborg study, I tried to capture the rich ambiguity of politics and planning in a 
modern democracy. I did this by focusing in-depth on the particular events that made up the case and 
on the minutiae that made up the events. Working with minutiae is time consuming, and I must 
concede that during the several years when I was toiling in the archives, doing interviews, making 
observations, talking with my informants, writing, and getting feedback, a nagging question kept 
resurfacing in my mind. This is a question bound to haunt many carrying out in-depth, dense case 
studies: 'Who will want to learn about a case like this, and in this kind of detail?' I wanted the Aalborg 
case study to be particularly dense because I wished to test the thesis that the most interesting 
phenomena in politics and planning, and those of most general import, would be found in the most 
minute and most concrete of details. Or to put the matter differently, I wanted to see whether the 
dualisms general-specific and abstract-concrete would metamorphose and vanish if I went into 
sufficiently deep detail. Richard Rorty has perceptively observed that the way to re-enchant the world 
is to stick to the concrete. Nietzsche similarly advocates a focus on 'little things.' Both Rorty and 
Nietzsche seem right to me. I saw the Aalborg case as being made up of the type of concrete, little 
things they talk about. Indeed, I saw the case itself as such a thing, what Nietzsche calls a discreet and 
apparently insignificant truth, which, when closely examined, would reveal itself to be pregnant with 
paradigms, metaphors, and general significance. That was my thesis, but theses can be wrong and case 
studies may fail. I was genuinely relieved when, eventually, the strategy of focusing on minutiae 
proved to be worth the effort. 
 Lisa Peattie (2001, 260) explicitly warns against summarizing dense case studies: 'It is simply 
that the very value of the case study, the contextual and interpenetrating nature of forces, is lost when 
one tries to sum up in large and mutually exclusive concepts.' The dense case study, according to 
Peattie is more useful for the practitioner and more interesting for social theory than either factual 
'findings' or the high-level generalizations of theory. 
 The opposite of summing up and 'closing' a case study is to keep it open. Here I have found 
the following two strategies to work particularly well in ensuring such openness. First, when writing 
up a case study, I demur from the role of omniscient narrator and summarizer. Instead, I tell the story 
in its diversity, allowing the story to unfold from the many-sided, complex, and sometimes conflicting 
stories that the actors in the case have told me. Second, I avoid linking the case with the theories of 
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any one academic specialization. Instead I relate the case to broader philosophical positions that cut 
across specializations. In this way I try to leave scope for readers of different backgrounds to make 
different interpretations and draw diverse conclusions regarding the question of what the case is a case 
of. The goal is not to make the case study be all things to all people. The goal is to allow the study to 
be different things to different people. I try to achieve this by describing the case with so many facets--
like life itself--that different readers may be attracted, or repelled, by different things in the case. 
Readers are not pointed down any one theoretical path or given the impression that truth might lie at 
the end of such a path. Readers will have to discover their own path and truth inside the case. Thus, in 
addition to the interpretations of case actors and case narrators, readers are invited to decide the 
meaning of the case and to interrogate actors' and narrators' interpretations in order to answer that 
categorical question of any case study: ‘What is this case a case of?’ 
Case stories written like this can neither be briefly recounted nor summarized in a few main 
results. The case story is itself the result. It is a 'virtual reality,' so to speak. For the reader willing to 
enter this reality and explore it inside and out the payback is meant to be a sensitivity to the issues at 
hand that cannot be obtained from theory. Students can safely be let loose in this kind of reality, which 
provides a useful training ground with insights into real-life practices that academic teaching often 
does not provide. 
 If we return briefly to the phenomenology for human learning we may understand why 
summarizing case studies is not always useful and may sometimes be counterproductive. Knowledge 
at the beginner’s level consists precisely in the reduced formulas which characterize theories, while 
true expertise is based on intimate experience with thousands of individual cases and on the ability to 
discriminate between situations, with all their nuances of difference, without distilling them into 
formulas or standard cases. The problem is analogous to the inability of heuristic, computer-based 
expert systems to approach the level of virtuoso human experts, even when the systems are compared 
with the experts who have conceived the rules upon which these systems operate. This is because the 
experts do not use rules but operate on the basis of detailed case-experience. This is real expertise. 
The rules for expert systems are formulated only because the systems require it; rules are characteristic 
of expert systems, but not of real human experts. 
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 In the same way, one might say that the rule formulation which takes place when researchers 
summarize their work into theories is characteristic of the culture of research, of researchers, and of 
theoretical activity, but such rules are not necessarily part of the studied reality constituted by 
Bourdieu’s (1977, 8, 15) ‘virtuoso social actors.’ Something essential may be lost by this 
summarizing--namely the possibility to understand virtuoso social acting, which, as Bourdieu has 
shown, cannot be distilled into theoretical formulae--and it is precisely their fear of losing this 
‘something,’ which makes case researchers cautious about summarizing their studies. Case researchers 
thus tend to be skeptical about erasing phenomenological detail in favor of conceptual closure.  
 Ludwig Wittgenstein shared this skepticism. According to Gasking and Jackson, Wittgenstein 
used the following metaphor when he described his use of the case study approach in philosophy: 
 
In teaching you philosophy I’m like a guide showing you how to find your way round London. I 
have to take you through the city from north to south, from east to west, from Euston to the 
embankment and from Piccadilly to the Marble Arch. After I have taken you many journeys 
through the city, in all sorts of directions, we shall have passed through any given street a number 
of times--each time traversing the street as part of a different journey. At the end of this you will 
know London; you will be able to find your way about like a born Londoner. Of course, a good 
guide will take you through the more important streets more often than he takes you down side 
streets; a bad guide will do the opposite. In philosophy I’m a rather bad guide (1967, 51). 
 
This approach implies exploring phenomena firsthand instead of reading maps of them. Actual 
practices are studied before their rules, and one is not satisfied by learning only about those parts of 
practices that are open to public scrutiny; what Erving Goffman (1963) calls the ‘backstage’ of social 
phenomena must be investigated, too, like the side streets which Wittgenstein talks about.  
 With respect to intervention in social and political affairs, Abbott (1992, 79) has rightly 
observed that a social science expressed in terms of typical case narratives would provide ‘far better 
access for policy intervention than the present social science of variables.’ MacIntyre (1984, 216) 
similarly says, ‘I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question 
‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’’ Several observers have noted that narrative is an 
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ancient method and perhaps our most fundamental form for making sense of experience. (Novak 1975, 
175; Mattingly 1991, 237; see also Abbott 1992, Arendt 1958, Carr 1986, Ricoeur 1984, Fehn et al. 
1992, Rasmussen 1995, and Bal 1997). 
 To MacIntyre (1984, 214, 216), the human being is a ‘story-telling animal,’ and the notion of a 
history is as fundamental a notion as the notion of an action. In a similar vein, Mattingly (1991, 237) 
points out that narratives not only give meaningful form to experiences we have already lived through. 
They also provide us a forward glance, helping us to anticipate situations even before we encounter 
them, allowing us to envision alternative futures. Narrative inquiries do not--indeed, cannot--start from 
explicit theoretical assumptions. Instead, they begin with an interest in a particular phenomenon that is 
best understood narratively. Narrative inquiries then develop descriptions and interpretations of the 
phenomenon from the perspective of participants, researchers, and others.  
 Labov (1966, 37-9) writes that when a good narrative is over ‘it should be unthinkable for a 
bystander to say, ‘So what’?’ Every good narrator is continually warding off this question. A narrative 
that lacks a moral that can be independently and briefly stated, is not necessarily pointless. And a 
narrative is not successful just because it allows a brief moral. A successful narrative does not allow 
the question to be raised at all. The narrative has already supplied the answer before the question is 
asked. The narrative itself is the answer (Nehamas 1985, 163-64). 
 A reformulation of the fifth misunderstanding, which states that it is often difficult to 
summarize specific case studies into general propositions and theories, thus reads as follows: 
 
It is correct that summarizing case studies is often difficult, especially as concerns case process. It 
is less correct as regards case outcomes. The problems in summarizing case studies, however, are 
due more often to the properties of the reality studied than to the case study as a research method. 
Often it is not desirable to summarize and generalize case studies. Good studies should be read as 
narratives in their entirety. 
 
It must again be emphasized that despite the difficulty or undesirability in summarizing case studies, 
the case study method in general can certainly contribute to the cumulative development of 
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knowledge; for example, in using the principles to test propositions described above under the second 
and third misunderstandings. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Today, when students and colleagues present me with the conventional wisdom about case-study 
research--for instance that one cannot generalize on the basis of a single case or that case studies are 
arbitrary and subjective--I know what to answer. By and large, the conventional wisdom is wrong or 
misleading. For the reasons given above, the case study is a necessary and sufficient method for 
certain important research tasks in the social sciences, and it is a method that holds up well when 
compared to other methods in the gamut of social science research methodology.  
When students ask me for reference to a good book on how to carry out case study research in 
practice, I usually recommend Robert Stake's (1995) The Art of Case Study Research. If the students 
are intellectually curious, I suggest they also read Charles Ragin and Howard Becker's (1992) What is 
a Case? Both books are first-rate and fit well with the views presented in this article. 
 Let me reiterate, however, that the revision of the five misunderstandings about case study 
research described above, should not be interpreted as a rejection of research which focuses on large 
random samples or entire populations; for example, questionnaire surveys with related quantitative 
analysis. This type of research is also essential for the development of social science; for example, in 
understanding the degree to which certain phenomena are present in a given group or how they vary 
across cases. The advantage of large samples is breadth, while their problem is one of depth. For the 
case study, the situation is the reverse. Both approaches are necessary for a sound development of 
social science.  
 Here as elsewhere, the sharp separation often seen in the literature between qualitative and 
quantitative methods is a spurious one. The separation is an unfortunate artifact of power relations and 
time constraints in graduate training; it is not a logical consequence of what graduates and scholars 
need to know to do their studies and do them well. In my interpretation, good social science is opposed 
to an either/or and stands for a both/and on the question of qualitative versus quantitative methods. 
Good social science is problem-driven and not methodology-driven, in the sense that it employs those 
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methods which for a given problematic best help answer the research questions at hand. More often 
than not, a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods will do the task best. Fortunately, there 
seems currently to be a general relaxation in the old and unproductive separation of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. 
 This being said, it should nevertheless be added that the balance between case studies and 
large samples is currently biased in favor of the latter in social science, so biased that it puts case 
studies at a disadvantage within most disciplines. In this connection, it is worth repeating the insight of 
Thomas Kuhn that a discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a 
discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars is an 
ineffective one. In social science more good case studies could help remedy this situation. 
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Table A: Strategies for the Selection of Samples and Cases 
 
Type of Selection  Purpose 
A. Random selection To avoid systematic biases in the sample. The 
sample’s size is decisive for generalization. 
 1. Random sample To achieve a representative sample which 
allows for generalization for the entire 
population. 
 2. Stratified sample To generalize for specially selected sub-groups 
within the population. 
B. Information-oriented selection To maximize the utility of information from 
small samples and single cases. Cases are 
selected on the basis of expectations about their 
information content. 
 1. Extreme/deviant cases To obtain information on unusual cases, which 
can be especially problematic or especially 
good in a more closely defined sense. 
 2. Maximum variation cases To obtain information about the significance of 
various circumstances for case process and 
outcome; e.g., three to four cases which are 
very different on one dimension: size, form of 
organization, location, budget, etc. 
 3. Critical cases To achieve information which permits logical 
deductions of the type, ‘if this is (not) valid for 
this case, then it applies to all (no) cases.’ 
 4. Paradigmatic cases To develop a metaphor or establish a school for 
the domain which the case concerns. 
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Notes 
 
                                                      
i. The quote is from the original first edition of the dictionary (1984). In the third edition (1994), a second 
paragraph has been added about the case study. The entry is still highly unbalanced, however, and still 
promotes the mistaken view that the case study is hardly a methodology in its own right, but is best seen as 
subordinate to investigations of larger samples. 
